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Abstract
We show that the problem of deciding whether in a multi-player perfect infor-
mation recursive game (i.e. a stochastic game with terminal rewards) there exists a
stationary Nash equilibrium ensuring each player a certain payoff is ∃R-complete.
Our result holds for acyclic games, where a Nash equilibrium may be computed
efficiently by backward induction, and even for deterministic acyclic games with
non-negative terminal rewards. We further extend our results to the existence of
Nash equilibria where a single player is surely winning. Combining our result
with known gadget games without any stationary Nash equilibrium, we obtain
that for cyclic games, just deciding existence of any stationary Nash equilibrium
is ∃R-complete. This holds for reach-a-set games, stay-in-a-set games, and for
deterministic recursive games.
1 Introduction
The most common solution concept for noncooperative games is that of a Nash equilib-
rium (NE), which was shown by Nash [25] to be guaranteed to exist in finite games in
strategic form. On the other hand, existence of a NE is not guaranteed in more general
models of games, and one must therefore settle for weaker solutions. From a com-
putational point of view this leads to the natural problem of deciding whether a given
game admits a NE. Likewise, if a NE is guaranteed to exist this leads to the natural
problem of computing a NE. In case a NE exists it will generally not be unique, and
some NE may be more desirable than others. For instance, if comparing two differ-
ent NE, all players may strictly prefer the first NE and we might consider the second
NE undesirable. From a computational point of view this leads to the natural problem
of deciding whether a given game admits a NE in which every player receives payoff
meeting a given payoff demand. The computational complexity of these three basic
problems naturally depends heavily on the model of games under consideration.
In the basic setting of finite games in strategic form, the computational complex-
ity of these problems is now well understood. The problem of computing a NE was
shown to be PPAD-complete for 2-player games by Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Pa-
padimitriou [13] and Chen and Deng [11] and FIXP-complete for m-player games,
when m ≥ 3, by Etessami and Yannakakis [15]. The problem of deciding existence
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of a NE meeting given payoff demands was shown to be NP-complete for 2-player
games by Gilboa and Zemel [18] and ∃R-complete for m-player games, when m ≥ 3,
by Garg et al. [17].
Littman et al. [24] studied the arguably much simpler case of two-player perfect
information extensive form games, which we shall refer to simply as tree games. Here a
NE is guaranteed to exist and may be computed efficiently by backward induction [33].
In this way one may in fact always find a pure NE. On the other hand, players are in
general required to make probabilistic choices in order to ensure maximum possible
payoff. While Littman et al. devise an efficient algorithm for computing the set of NE
payoffs for deterministic games, they show that for two-player games with chance-
nodes, it is NP-hard to decide existence of a NE meeting given payoff demands. One
may for two-player games also prove NP-membership of this problem, thereby settling
its complexity.
A more general setting where backward induction also show existence and efficient
computation of NE is that of perfect information games that are given as a directed
acyclic graph. We shall refer to these simply as acyclic games. Here the strategies
of the players may in general depend on past history, but we shall here mainly be
interested in the simple case when strategies just depend on the current node of the
graph, i.e. stationary strategies.
Our main result is that for m-player perfect information acyclic games, m ≥ 7,
it is ∃R-complete to decide existence of a stationary NE meeting given payoff de-
mands. This problem is thus presumably significantly harder for acyclic games than
for tree games. Recently several works have proved ∃R-completeness for decision
problems about NE in multiplayer games, but these all concerns games in strategic
form [27, 17, 2, 3, 21, 1], or the even more general models of extensive-form games
with perfect recall but imperfect information [21] and extensive form games with im-
perfect recall [20]. In contrast, our results are the first ∃R-completeness results for
perfect information games.
Acyclic games form a special case of perfect information recursive games, which
again form a special case of perfect information stochastic games. The complexity of
deciding existence of a NE meeting given payoff demands in multiplayer stochastic
games was first studied systematically by Ummels and Wojtczak [32, 30]. Motivated
by applications to verification and synthesis of reactive systems, they study the cases of
games where players have ω-regular objectives and of mean-payoff games, in addition
to the special case of recursive games. Ummels and Wojtczak show that the problem
of existence of a NE meeting given payoff constraints1 is undecidable for 10-player
recursive games with non-negative terminal rewards or for deterministic 14-player re-
cursive games. Since then, Das et al. [12] improved this, by showing undecidability of
recursive games with non-negative terminal rewards with just 5 players. In the more
general setting of concurrent games, Bouyer et al. [7] even showed undecidability of
the problem of existence of a NE where a given player is surely winning for determin-
istic concurrent 3-players games with reachability objectives.
In order to obtain decidability, Ummels and Wojtczak considered positional and
stationary NE. For existence of stationary NE meeting given payoff constraints, they
prove NP-hardness for 2-player recursive games with non-negative terminal rewards
and for n-player deterministic recursive games (with n being part of the input), and
they prove SQRTSUM-hardness for 4-player recursive games with non-negative termi-
1Ummels and Wojtczak consider having both lower bounds (i.e. demands) and upper bounds on payoffs.
Their results however also holds with few changes assuming just payoff demands.
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nal rewards and for 8-player deterministic recursive games. On the other hand, they
show PSPACE-membership of existence of a NE meeting given payoff constraint for
recursive games, games with common ω-regular objectives, and mean-payoff games.
One may observe that their proofs in fact give ∃R-membership (cf. Section 3.4).
From our initial ∃R-completeness result we show that deciding existence of a sta-
tionary NE meeting given payoff demands is ∃R-complete also for deterministic 13-
player acyclic games with non-negative terminal rewards. To prove this we make use
of a modified version of a gadget constructed by Ummels and Wojtczak [30] to simu-
late chance nodes. To use this modified gadget we rely on the fact, that we have proved
∃R-hardness for acyclic games. In passing, we also observe that the chance node gad-
get can be combined with the NP-hardness result for tree games of Littman et al. [24]
to give NP-hardness for deterministic tree games.
Combining our results for acyclic games with known gadget games without any
stationary NE, we obtain that for cyclic games, just deciding existence of any station-
ary NE is ∃R-complete. This holds for reach-a-set games, stay-in-a-set games, and
for deterministic recursive games. Ummels previously proved NP-hardness and SQRT-
SUM-hardness for deciding existence of any stationary NE in reach-a-set games [29,
Corollary 4.9]. The gadgets used for the last two constructions were only constructed
recently and to use them we again rely on the fact that we have proved ∃R-hardness for
acyclic games.
2 Preliminaries
For a finite set S, let ∆(S) denote the set of probability distributions on S. Denote by
∆n ⊆ Rn+1 the standard n-simplex {x ∈ Rn+1 | x ≥ 0∧∑n+1i=1 xi = 1}. We may then
identify ∆n and ∆({1, . . . ,n+ 1}) in the natural way. Denote by ∆nc ⊆ R
n the standard
corner n-simplex {x ∈ Rn | x≥ 0∧∑ni=1 xi ≤ 1}.
We next define the types of games, payoffs, and equilibria we consider in this paper.
Striving for a uniform exposition we modify common definitions in slight and non-
essential ways.
2.1 Perfect Information Stochastic Games
An m-player perfect information stochastic game G is given by a directed graph (di-
graph) D = (V,A). For u ∈ V denote by N+(u) = {v ∈ V | (u,v) ∈ A} the out-neigh-
borhood of u. Let T = {u ∈ V | N+(u) = /0} denote the set of sink nodes of D,
also called the terminals. The non-terminal nodes are partitioned into disjoint sets
V \T =V0∪V1∪·· ·∪Vm, whereV0 is the set of chance nodes andVi is the set of Player i
nodes, when i≥ 1. To each v∈V0 is assigned a probability distribution piv ∈ ∆(N+(v)).
We say the game G is deterministic if V0 = /0.
We fix an initial node u0 ∈ V from which play proceeds in rounds. A history of
play is an infinite sequence (ut)t≥0 such that (ut ,ut+1) ∈ A when ut /∈ T and ut+1 = ut
when ut ∈ T . Let H∞ denote the set of all such histories. A finite history is a prefix of
a history of play. For i≥ 0 and v ∈Vi, let Hi,v denote the set of finite histories (ut)Tt=0
ending in node uT = v. For i≥ 0, let Hi = ∪v∈ViHi,v denote the finite histories ending
in a node in Vi, and finally let H = ∪i≥0Hi denote the set of all finite histories. If
some prefix of a play is contained in Hi,v for some i and v ∈ Vi we say that the play
reaches v. A finite history h= (ut)Tt=0 ∈H defines a subgame G[h] ofG with uT being
the initial node of G[h], play proceeding from uT in rounds extending h.
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2.1.1 Strategies and Equilibria
A strategy τi for Player i assigns to each h ∈ Hi,v a probability distribution τi(h) ∈
∆(N+(v)). The strategy τi is stationary if τi(h) = τi(h′) for every h,h′ ∈Hi,v and every
v ∈ Vi, i.e. when τi only depends on v. The strategy τi is pure if τi(h) is a single-point
distribution for every h ∈Hi. A positional strategy is a strategy that is simultaneously
pure and stationary.
A strategy profile τ = (τ1, . . . ,τm) consists of a strategy for each player. The
strategy profile is stationary, pure, or positional if all of its strategies are stationary,
pure, or positional, respectively. The set of plays that extend a given finite history
h = (ut)
T
t=0 is called a cylinder set. The total probability of these plays is given by
the product ∏T−1t=0 pt · (ut+1) where pt = τi(u0, . . . ,ut) when ut ∈ Vi for some i ≥ 1
and where pt = piut when ut ∈ V0. By Carathéodory’s extension theorem this defines
a unique probability measure on the Borel σ -algebra generated by the cylinders sets.
Assume now that each Player i is equipped with a bounded Borel measurable util-
ity function ui : H∞ → R. Let u : H∞ → Rm denote the vector function of utilities
u(h) = (u1(h), . . . ,um(h)). Given a strategy profile τ , the expected payoff Ui(x) for
Player i is given by Ui(τ) = Eτ [ui(h)]. We let U(τ) = (U1(τ), . . . ,Um(τ)) denote the
payoff profile of τ .
Given a strategy profile τ we let τ−i =(τ1, . . . ,τi−1,τi+1, . . . ,τm) denote the strategy
profile of all players except Player i. Given a strategy τ ′i for Player i, we let (τ−i;τ
′
i )
denote the strategy profile (τ1, . . . ,τi−1,τ ′i ,τi+1, . . . ,τm). We also denote (τ−i;τ
′
i ) by
τ \ τ ′i . We say that τ
′
i is a best reply for Player i to τ if ui(τ \ τ
′
i ) ≥ ui(τ \ τ
′′
i ) for all
strategies τ ′′i of Player i. We say that τ is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if τi is a best reply
to τ for every Player i.
Any finite history h ∈ H induces a conditional strategy τi[h] in the subgame G[h]
from a strategy τi of Player i. We say that τ = (τ1, . . . ,τm) is a subgame perfect equilib-
rium (SPE) if the conditional strategy profile τ[h] = (τ1[h], . . . ,τm[m]) is a NE in G(h),
for every h ∈H .
2.1.2 Utility Functions
We shall consider several different types of utility functions which in turn gives rise to
different classes of games. In a recursive game [16] only plays that reach a terminal are
assigned non-zero utility. We may thus view the utility functions as functions ui : T →
R, also known as terminal rewards. Recursive games where all terminal payoffs are
non-negative or non-positive are respectively called non-negative recursive games and
non-positive recursive games. If we normalize the utility functions to take values in the
range [−1,1], every terminal reward vector u(v), for v ∈ T , can be written as a convex
combination ∑ki=1 αkpk of vectors pk ∈ {−1,0,1}
m. By replacing terminal nodes with
payoff u(v) with an additional chance node going to a terminal with payoff pk with
probability αk, we transform a recursive game into an equivalent recursive game with
terminal reward vectors from the set {−1,0,1}m.
In a mean-payoff game [19, 14], Player i is given a reward function ri :V →R and
the utility assigned to a play h= (ut)t≥0 is ui(h) = liminf
T→∞
1
T ∑
T−1
t=0 ri(ut), for all i. Note
that a recursive game is a special case of a mean-payoff game, where all non-terminal
nodes are given reward 0.
Utility functions that are indicator functions of Borel sets of plays are called objec-
tives. For convenience we simply identify the objective with its defining set of plays.
For S ⊆ V , the reachability objective Reach(S) is the set of plays that reach a node in
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S and the safety objective Safe(S) is the set of plays that only reach nodes in S. Games
in which all players have reachability objectives are called reach-a-set games [10] and
games in which all players have safety objectives are called stay-in-a-set games [28].
We say that Reach(S) is a terminal reachability objective if S ⊆ T and similarly that
Safe(S) is a terminal safety objective if V \T ⊆ S. Note that a reach-a-set game with
terminal reachability objectives is equivalent to a recursive game with terminal rewards
from the set {0,1}. Likewise, a stay-in-a-set game with terminal safety objectives is
equivalent to a recursive game with terminal rewards from the set {−1,0}. Other ob-
jectives of interest are the standard ω-regular objectives of Büchi, co-Büchi, Parity,
Streett, Rabin, Muller objectives, see e.g. [32] for definitions. These objectives all
generalize terminal reachability and safety objectives.
2.1.3 Games on Trees and DAGs
When the digraph D of a given perfect information stochastic game G is acyclic we
refer to G as an acyclic game. Likewise, when D is a tree we refer to G as a tree game.
A tree game is in particular an acyclic game.
In an acyclic game we have that every play reaches a terminal. For a general acyclic
game there may be multiple plays reaching the same terminal, but for a tree game there
is a unique play reaching each specific terminal. Thus for a tree game we may view
the utility functions simply as terminal payoffs. This also means that tree games corre-
spond exactly to perfect information extensive form games. The method of backward
induction [33] shows existence of a (pure) SPE for any terminal payoff acyclic game,
and by considering the unfolding of an acyclic game into a tree game, also a SPE for
any acyclic game.
2.2 The Existential Theory of the Reals
The existential theory of the reals ETR is the set of all true sentences of the form
∃x1, . . . ,xn ∈ R : ϕ(x1, . . . ,xn), where ϕ is a quantifier-free Boolean formula of in-
equalities and equalities of polynomials with integer coefficients. Schaefer and Šte-
fankovicˇ [27] defined the complexity class ∃R as the closure of ETR under polynomial
time many-one reductions. Alternatively, ∃R is equal to the constant-free Boolean part
of the class NPR [8], which is the analogue class to NP in the Blum-Shub-Smale model
of computation [4]. Clearly NP ⊆ ∃R and from the decision procedure by Canny [9]
we have that ∃R⊆ PSPACE.
A fundamental complete problem for ∃R is the problem QUAD of deciding whether
a system S of quadratic polynomials in n variables with integer coefficients has a
solution in Rn [4]. Schaefer [26] proved that the similar problem QUAD(B(0,1)) of
deciding whether the system S has a solution in the unit ball is also ∃R-complete.
Analogously one can prove (cf. [21]) that the problem QUAD(∆c) of deciding whether
the system S has a solution in the corner simplex ∆nc is ∃R-complete.
Define HOMQUAD(∆) as the problem of deciding whether a system S ′ of homo-
geneous quadratic polynomials in n variables with integer coefficients has a solution in
the unit simplex ∆n−1. This problem will form the basis of our ∃R-hardness results.
Proposition 1. HOMQUAD(∆) is ∃R-complete.
Proof. Membership of ∃R is straightforward. To obtain ∃R-hardness we reduce from
QUAD(∆c). SupposeS is a system of quadratic equations in n−1 variables x1, . . . ,xn−1.
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Introduce the slack variable xn = 1−∑n−1i=1 xi. We may then homogenize each poly-
nomial of S forming the set of homogeneous quadratic polynomials S ′, replacing
constant terms of the form a by ∑ni=1 ∑
n
j=1 axix j and degree 1 terms of the form axi by
∑nj=1 axix j. Solutions of S in ∆
n−1
c then correspond exactly to solutions of S
′ in ∆n,
by either introducing or dropping the slack variable xn.
3 ∃R-Completeness of Stationary NE
Consider an m-player game G and let L ∈ Rm be a vector of payoff demands. We say
that a strategy profile τ satisfies the payoff demands L if U(τ) ≥ L (with component-
wise comparison).
Our main result is a precise characterization of the complexity of deciding exis-
tence of stationary NE in perfect information recursive games satisfying given payoff
demands.
Theorem 1. It is ∃R-complete to decide whether for a given m-player recursive game
G and payoff demands L ∈ Rm there exists a stationary NE τ with U(τ) ≥ L. The
problem is ∃R-complete even for acyclic 7-player recursive games with non-negative
rewards. The same result holds for the analogous problem for stationary SPE.
Membership of ∃R follows by expressing that τ is a stationary NE (SPE) satisfying
the given payoff demands by an existential first-order formula over the reals. This
is done by expressing for all i that τi is an optimal solution of the Markov Decision
Process (MDP) for Player i that results from fixing the strategies of the other players
according to τ−i. Ummels and Wojtczak give a detailed proof for the (more general)
case of mean-payoff games [30, Theorem 7] (see the full version of the paper [31] for
the actual proof). We return to this in Section 3.4.
Our proof of ∃R-hardness is by reduction from the problem HOMQUAD(∆) and
involves several gadget games that we describe next. In the following letS be a system
of homogeneous quadratic polynomials q1(x), . . . ,qℓ(x) in variables x = (x1, . . . ,xn).
We write qk(x) = ∑
n
i=1 ∑
n
j=1a
k
i jxix j for k = 1, . . . , ℓ, and assume that coefficients are
scaled to be rational numbers in the interval [−1,1]. That is aki j ∈Q and −1≤ a
k
i j ≤ 1,
for all i, j,k.
Remark 1. For clarity, drawings of the many gadget games are provided in accompa-
nying figures. Chance nodes v ∈ V0 are diamond-shaped with out-going arcs labelled
by the values of piv. Nodes v ∈ Vi controlled by Player i are circular nodes labelled
with i above and unlabelled out-going arcs. Nodes themselves may also contain labels,
though these labels are only used to refer to the specific nodes inside the proofs.
The first gadget is the variable selection game Gvar shown in Figure 1. An initial
chance node leads to Player 1 nodes v1, . . . ,vn, each chosen with probability 1n . In
node vi, Player 1 makes a binary choice between either giving payoff 1 to Player 2 and
Player 4 or to Player 3 and Player 5 and all other players payoff 0. We let xi denote the
probability of the former choice, and let x = (x1, . . . ,xn). Since 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, it follows
that x≥ 0 and ‖x‖1 ≤ n.
The payoff analysis of Gvar is straightforward.
Lemma 1. The payoff profile of the subgame of Gvar starting from node vi is equal to
(0,xi,1− xi,xi,1− xi,0,0), for i= 1, . . . ,n. The payoff profile of the game Gvar itself is
of the form (
0, 1
n
‖x‖1,1−
1
n
‖x‖1,
1
n
‖x‖1,1−
1
n
‖x‖1,0,0
)
.
6
vi
1
→
(0,1,0,1,0,0,0)
(0,0,1,0,1,0,0)
xi
1−xi
(a) The nodes vi of Gvar
→
v1
vn
1
n
1
n
...
(b) The game Gvar
Figure 1: The variable selection game Gvar.
We eventually want to enforce that x ∈ ∆n−1 by payoff demands. Note that this can be
obtained locally in Gvar by payoff demands 1n for Player 2 and
n−1
n
for Player 3.
The second gadget is the multiplication game Gmul(i, j,α), defined for 1≤ i, j ≤ n
and α ∈ [0,1] and shown in Figure 2. Note that it connects to nodes vi and v j of Gvar.
By Lemma 1 these may be viewed as terminal nodes with reward vectors (0,xi,1−
xi,xi,1− xi,0,0) and (0,x j,1− x j,x j,1− x j,0,0), and we shall do so in the analysis in
order to be able to analyze Gmul(i, j,α) separately.
First Player 2 and Player 3 are able to threat to leave to node vi. Otherwise Player 1
is given a binary choice: either continue or give Player 1 and Player 3 reward 1. We
denote by x′i the probability of the former choice. If Player 1 continues, Player 4 and
Player 5 are able to threat to leave to node v j. Otherwise Player 1 is given a binary
choice between terminal reward vectors (1,1,0,1,0,α,1−α) and (1,1,0,0,1,0,0).
We denote by x′j the probability the former choice.
vi
w1
2
→ w2
3
w3
1
(1,0,1,0,0,0,0)
w4
4
w5
5
v j
w6
1
(1,1,0,1,0,α,1−α)
(1,1,0,0,1,0,0)
x′i
1−x′i
x′j
1−x′j
Figure 2: The multiplication game Gmul(i, j,α).
Lemma 2. Any NE payoff profile of Gmul(i, j,α) in which Player 1 receives payoff 1 is
of the form
(1,xi,1− xi,xix j,xi(1− x j),αxix j,(1−α)xix j) .
Proof. For Player 1 to receive payoff 1, neither of Player 2, 3, 4, or 5 execute their
threats to leave to vi or v j with positive probability. Conditioned on play reaching node
w3, Player 2 and Player 3 receives payoff x′i and 1− x
′
i, respectively. Thus, unless
x′i = xi, either Player 2 or Player 3 would gain by leaving to vi in node w1 or w2.
Similarly, conditioned on play reaching node w6, Player 4 and Player 5 receive payoff
x′j and 1−x
′
j, respectively. Thus, unless x
′
j = x j, either Player 4 or Player 5 would gain
by leaving to v j in node w4 or w5. It follows that the payoff profile is as claimed.
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The third gadget is the polynomial evaluation game Gpoly(k) defined by the polyno-
mial qk(x) and shown in Figure 3. First Player 6 and Player 7 are in turn able to threat
to leave to a terminal giving payoff 1/(2n2) (and all other players payoff 0). Other-
wise a chance node leads to the game Gmul(i, j,(1+ aki j)/2), with probability 1/n
2, for
i, j = 1, . . . ,n.
6
→
(0,0,0,0,0, 1
2n2
,0)
7
(0,0,0,0,0,0, 1
2n2
)
Gmul(x1,x1,
1+ak1,1
2 )
Gmul(xi,x j,
1+aki, j
2 )
Gmul(xn,xn,
1+akn,n
2 )
1
n2
1
n2
Figure 3: The polynomial evaluation game Gpoly(k)
The analysis of Gpoly(k) follows by using Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. Any NE payoff profile of Gpoly(k) in which Player 1 receive payoff 1 is of
the form(
1, 1
n
‖x‖1,1−
1
n
‖x‖1,(
1
n
‖x‖1)
2, 1
n
‖x‖1(1−
1
n
‖x‖1),
1
2n2
(‖x‖21+ qk(x)),
1
2n2
(‖x‖21− qk(x))
)
.
Proof. For Player 1 to receive payoff 1, neither Player 6 nor Player 7 execute their
threats to leave directly to the terminal nodes. Likewise, Player 1 must receive payoff 1
in each of the games Gmul(i, j,(1+ aki j)/2), each of which by Lemma 2 then has the
payoff profile (1,xi,1− xi,xix j,xi(1− x j),(1+ aki j)xix j/2,(1− a
k
i j)xix j/2). Taking the
average of this over all pairs i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} is easily seen to yield the claimed payoff
vector. For instance, the payoff of Player 6 is equal to
1
n2
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
(
1+ aki j
2
)
xix j =
1
2n2
((
n
∑
i=1
xi
)(
n
∑
j=1
x j
)
+
(
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
aki jxix j
))
=
1
2n2
(‖x‖21+ qk(x)) .
Corollary 1. In a NE of Gpoly where ‖x‖1 = 1 and Player 1 receives payoff 1 we must
have that qk(x) = 0.
Proof. Again, for Player 1 to receive payoff 1, neither of Player 6 and Player 7 execute
their threats to leave directly to the the terminal nodes. For this to happen it is required
that 1
2n2
(‖x‖21+qk(x))≥
1
2n2
and 1
2n2
(‖x‖21−qk(x))≥
1
2n2
. When ‖x‖1 = 1 this implies
that 1
2n2
qk(x)≥ 0 and −
1
2n2
qk(x)≥ 0, and thus qk(x) = 0.
We now have all the ingredients needed for our ∃R-hardness proof.
Proof of Theorem 1. We already discussed the proof of ∃R membership. For proving
∃R hardness we reduce from HOMQUAD(∆). As above, let S be a system of homoge-
neous quadratic polynomials q1(x), . . . ,qℓ(x) in variables x=(x1, . . . ,xn). We construct
8
v0
↓
Gvar
Gpoly(q1)
Gpoly(qℓ)
1
2
1
2
1
ℓ
1
ℓ
...
Figure 4: The game G (S ).
the gameG (S ) as shown in Figure 4. Using initial chance nodes, play proceeds to Gvar
with probability 12 and to Gpoly(k) with probability
1
2ℓ , for k = 1, . . . , ℓ.
We shall prove that G (S ) has a stationary NE satisfying the payoff demands
L=
(
1
2
,
1
n
,1−
1
n
,
1+ n
2n2
,
2n− 1
2n2
,
1
4n2
,
1
4n2
)
,
if and only if there exists x ∈ ∆n−1 such that qk(x) = 0, for all k.
Suppose first that G (S ) has a NE satisfying the payoff demands L. Since Player 1
receives payoff 0 in Gvar, Player 1 must receive payoff 1 in every game Gpoly(k). Thus
by Lemma 3 Player 2 and Player 3 receive payoff 1
n
‖x‖1 and 1−
1
n
‖x‖1, respectively,
which by Lemma 1 also is their payoff in Gvar. We conclude that 1n‖x‖1 and 1−
1
n
‖x‖1
is also the payoff of Player 2 and Player 3 in G (S ). The payoff demands L gives that
1
n
‖x‖1≥ 1 and 1−
1
n
‖x‖1≥ 1−
1
n
, which implies ‖x‖1 = 1. By Corollary 1 this implies
qk(x) = 0 for all k.
Suppose now that x ∈ ∆n−1 is such that qk(x) = 0 for all k. We let Player 1 play
according to x in Gvar and consistent to that (i.e. also according to x) in Gmul(i, j,(1+
aki j)/2), for all i, j,k. We let all other players not execute any of their threats. It remains
to be shown that this strategy profile τ is a NE. No strategy profile yields payoff larger
than 12 to Player 1, so Player 1 has no incentive to change strategy. What remains
to prove is that no player gains from executing a threat. In Gmul(i, j,(1+ aki j)/2), if
either Player 2 or 3 execute their threat to vi in Gvar then their payoff stays unchanged,
since Player 1 is playing according to xi in both vi and w3. Likewise, the payoffs for
Player 4 and Player 5 are neither improved by executing their threat to v j. In Gpoly(k),
since ‖x‖1 = 1 and qk(x) = 0, Player 6 and Player 7 are both receiving payoff
1
2n2
which is also exactly what they would receive by executing their threat. This concludes
the proof that x defines a NE. Let us finally note that the payoff profile of Gvar is
(0, 1
n
,1− 1
n
, 1
n
,1− 1
n
,0,0) and the (average of) the payoff profiles of Gpoly(k) is (1, 1n ,
1− 1
n
, 1
n2
, 1
n
(1− 1
n
), 1
2n2
, 1
2n2
), and the average of these is exactly L. Let us finally note
that τ is easily seen to in fact be a SPE.
Remark 2. We only used the first 3 entries of the payoff demands L to argue a NE
satisfying the payoff demand implies the system S is satisfied. We could therefore
equivalently have used the demands L= ( 12 ,
1
n
, n−1
n
,0,0,0,0).
3.1 Deterministic Games
Ummels and Wojtczak [30] constructed a gadget that allows for simulation of a chance
node by a deterministic game under certain conditions. Ummels and Wojtczak used
this to prove that deciding existence of a stationary NE is SQRTSUM-hard for 8-player
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recursive games. Their proof constructs games with both positive and negative terminal
rewards. Terminals with negative rewards are used to make a player prefer infinite play
away from terminals to such a terminal. We describe their gadget below, modified
to have non-negative terminal rewards (and thus not applicable in the reduction of
Ummels and Wojtczak). In acyclic games, as we have constructed, any play reaches a
terminal, and in turn makes non-negative rewards sufficient.
Let p ∈ ∆nc with ‖p‖1 < 1. We construct a gadget game Gchance(p) with desig-
nated nodes u1 . . . ,un in order to simulate a single chance node that for each i =
1, . . . ,n continues play in nodes ui with probability pi and with the remaining prob-
ability 1−‖p‖1 > 0 leads to a terminal⊥.
Define q1, . . . ,qn by
qi =
1−∑nj=i p j
1−∑nj=i+1 p j
.
Note that ∏nj=i q j = 1−∑
n
j=i p j for all i = 1, . . . ,n. The chance node described above
can be simulated by the following stochastic process in steps k= 0, . . . ,n. When k< n,
we select node un−k as the outcome with probability 1− qn−k, and otherwise proceed
to the next step k+ 1 with probability qn−k. When k = n, we end with outcome ⊥.
Then the probability of outcome ui is equal to
(1− qi)
n
∏
j=i+1
q j = (
n
∏
j=i+1
q j)− (
n
∏
j=i
q j) = (1−
n
∑
j=i+1
p j)− (1−
n
∑
j=i
p j) = pi
as required.
sn
2
→ ti+1
1
si
2
ri
3
ti
1
t1
1
(1,0,1)· · · · · ·
q′i q
′
1
(0,1− qˆn,0) ui+1 (0,1− qˆi,0) (0,0, qˆi) ui u1
1−q′i+1 1−q
′
i 1−q
′
1
Figure 5: The game Gchance(p).
The game Gchance(p) shown in Figure 5 consists of non-terminal nodes si, ti,ri and
ui, for i= 1, . . . ,n, with the initial node being sn. Player 1 has the role of implementing
the chance node, whereas Player 2 and Player 3 incentivize Player 1 to play using the
probabilities q1, . . . ,qn by means of threats. In nodes ti Player 1 has the choice between
node ui, or when i > 1 continuing in node si−1 and when i = 1 end in a terminal with
rewards (1,0,1), corresponding to ⊥. Before each node ti, Player 2 and Player 3 are
able to threat to end in terminals with rewards (0,1− qˆi,0) and (0,0, qˆi) from nodes si
and ti, respectively, where we define qˆi by
qˆi =
i
∏
j=1
q j =
1−∑nj=1 p j
1−∑nj=i+1 p j
.
Lemma 4. Consider the game derived from Gchance(p) where each node ui is changed
to be a terminal node with rewards (1,1,0). Then, play according to any stationary NE
in which Player 1 receives payoff 1 reaches terminal ui with probability pi, for all i.
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Proof. For Player 1 to receive payoff 1, play must reach either one of the terminals ui
or ⊥ with probability 1, so no threat is executed by Player 2 and Player 3. Suppose
Player 1 chooses node ui with probability 1− q′i, for every i. Since Player 3 only re-
ceives a positive reward in⊥, play must reach⊥with positive probability which means
q′i > 0 for all i. For a given i and conditioned on play reaching si, Player 2 receives
payoff 1−∏ij=1q
′
j and Player 3 receives payoff ∏
i
j=1 q
′
j. For Player 2 and Player 3 to
not execute their threats in si and ri it is required that 1−∏ij=1 q
′
j ≥ 1−∏
i
j=1 q j and
∏ij=1 q
′
j ≥ ∏
i
j=1 q j, which implies ∏
i
j=1 q
′
j = ∏
i
j=1 q j. Since this must hold for all i,
we have q′i = qi for all i, and thus play reaches terminal ui with probability pi for all
i.
Using the construction above, we are able to replace the chance nodes in G (S )
used to prove Theorem 1. The chance node v0 and its two immediate chance nodes can
be combined into a single one with outgoing arcs to v1,v2, . . . ,vn in Gvar with proba-
bility 14n and arcs to Gpoly(q1), . . . ,Gpoly(qℓ) with probability
1
4ℓ . With the remaining
probability of 12 the chance node leads to a new terminal ⊥0 where all 7 original play-
ers of G (S ) receive payoff 0. This modified chance node can be replaced with the
gadget of Lemma 4, which adds three new players to the construction. In the terminals
of all subgames (including the terminals added next), the first two newly added players
receive payoff 1 while the third receives 0. Similarly, the chance node within Gpoly(qk)
can be replaced with a chance node, that leads with probability 12 to a terminal ⊥k and
with probability 1
2n2
to Gmul(xi,x j,(1+ aki, j)/2), for all i, j,k. To compensate for this
new terminal, the payoff in the threats by the original sixth and seventh player is de-
creased to 1
4n2
. Since each Gpoly(qk) is independent of another, these chance nodes can
be replaced by only adding another 3 players, rather than 3ℓ.
We therefore obtain the following result for deterministic recursive games.
Theorem 2. It is ∃R-complete to decide whether for a given m-player deterministic
recursive game G and payoff demands L ∈ Rm there exists a stationary NE τ with
U(τ)≥ L. The problem is ∃R-complete even for 13-player acyclic deterministic games
with non-negative rewards. The same result holds for the analogous problem for sta-
tionary SPE.
Proof. The result follows by similar argumentation as in the proof of Theorem 1 on the
payoff vector L= ( 18 ,
3
8n ,
3
8 (1−
1
n
),0,0,0,0,1,0,0, 14 ,0,0) together with Lemma 4.
3.2 Stationary NE where a Player Wins Almost Surely
Theorem 1 and 2 are both concerned with existence of a Stationary NE given a payoff
demand. Both were proven using a payoff demand L that is non-zero for more than one
player. In applications of verification and synthesis it is of interest to discern whether
there exists a Nash equilibria, where a single player can expect the maximal payoff 1;
that is, where a player is almost surely winning.
Consider the game Gsure(S ) in Figure 6, where Player 1, Player 2, and Player 3
can choose to not continue into the game G (S ) used in the proof of Theorem 1, but
instead end the game early at a terminal with payoff L of Remark 2. An eighth player
is added, who always gains payoff 1 in G (S ) but only payoff 0 at the newly added
terminal. We then obtain the following extensions of Theorem 1.
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t1
1
→ t2
2
t3
3
G (S )
(
1
2 ,
1
n
, n−1
n
,0,0,0,0,0
)
Figure 6: The game Gsure(S )
Theorem 3. It is ∃R-complete to decide whether for a given m-player recursive game
G and a given k, there exists a stationary NE in which Player k is almost surely win-
ning. The problem is ∃R-complete even for acyclic 8-player recursive games with
non-negative rewards. The same result holds for the analogous problem for stationary
SPE.
Proof. In a stationary NE of Gsure(S ), Player 8 is almost surely winning if and only if
neither Player 1, Player 2, nor Player 3 execute their threat to end the game early. The
payoff for executing the threat is respectively 12 ,
1
n
, and n−1
n
, which also is their payoff
in the proof of Theorem 1. That is, the three players effectively enforce the payoff
demand L of Remark 2 to G (S ).
To extend Theorem 2, we add two more threats t8 and t10 to Gsure(S ) before going
into G (S ). Here, Player 8 and Player 10, who implement the chance nodes, enforce
their part of the payoff. The payoff on all threats is then the payoff demand mentioned
in the proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 4. It is ∃R-complete to decide whether for a given m-player deterministic
recursive gameG and a given k, there exists a stationary NE in which Player k is almost
surely winning. The problem is ∃R-complete even for 14-player acyclic deterministic
games with non-negative rewards. The same result holds for the analogous problem
for stationary SPE.
3.3 Stationary NE without Payoff Demands
Theorem 1 settles the complexity of deciding existence of stationary NE satisfying
payoff demands. While deciding the mere existence of any NE may seem to be an
easier problem, we show that is exactly as hard.
Suppose that we have an m-player gadget game GnoNE which does not have a sta-
tionary NE and Player 1, 2, and 3 receive payoff 0 for all strategy profiles of the players;
examples of such gadgets will be elaborated below. Let L of Remark 2 to G (S ). Con-
struct now the game G∃NE(S ) shown in Figure 7, where similar to Gsure(S ) the first
three players can choose not to go into G (S ) but into a different subgame. On this al-
ternative path, a chance node t4 leads with probability 12 to a terminal, which has twice
the payoff demand L. In the other case, the chance node leads to GnoNE.
Lemma 5. The game G∃NE(S ) has a stationary NE if and only if there is a stationary
NE of G (S ) satisfying the payoff demands L.
Proof. Since GnoNE does not permit a stationary NE, the game G∃NE(S ) has a NE if
and only if none of Player 1, Player 2, and Player 3 execute their threat to go to t4.
12
t1
1
→ t2
2
t3
3
t4
G (S )
GnoNE 2 ·
(
1
2 ,
1
n
, n−1
n
,0, . . . ,0
)
1
2
1
2
Figure 7: The game G∃NE(S )
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3, the three players enforce the payoff demand L of
Remark 2 to G (S ).
Boros and Gurvich [5] and Kuipers et al. [23] (cf. [29, Proposition 3.3]) construct
a (cyclic) 3-player recursive game with non-negative rewards which has no stationary
NE. We may let Player 4, 5, and 6 take the role of playing in this game, letting Player 1,
2, and 3 receive reward 0 in all terminals. Together with Theorem 1 we obtain the
following result.
Theorem 5. It is ∃R-complete to decide whether a given m-player recursive game has
a stationary NE, even for 7-player recursive games with non-negative rewards.
t1
1
→
t2
2
t3
3
t8
8
t10
10
G (S )′
GnoNE
Figure 8: The game G ′∃NE(S )
In continuation of Section 3.1 we would like to dispense with the chance node
t4 to thereby combine Theorem 2 with Theorem 5. We thus consider the game in
Figure 8, where t4 has been removed in favor of going directly to GnoNE and a threat
is added for the chance node implemented by Player 8 and 10. Unlike above, since
play never reaching a terminal results in payoff 0, then it is not possible to guarantee
positive payoffs in the GnoNE. Instead, let G (S )′ be the game obtained from G (S ) of
Theorem 2 where all terminal rewards of Player 1, 2, 3, 8, and 10 have been decreased
by 18 ,
3
8n ,
3n−3
8n ,1, and
1
4 , respectively. Since the game is acyclic, and hence reaches a
terminal with probability 1, this does not change the NE of the game, but just subtracts
1
8 ,
3
8n ,
3n−3
8n ,1, and
1
4 from the NE payoffs of Player 1, 2, 3, 8, and 10, respectively.
Boros et al. [6] recently constructed a deterministic 3-player recursive game with-
out a stationary NE. As above, we can let Player 4, 5, and 6 take the role of playing in
this game, letting Player 1, 2, and 3 receive reward 0 in all terminals. Repeating the
arguments in the proof of Lemma 5 and Theorem 2 we obtain the following result.
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Theorem 6. It is ∃R-complete to decide whether a given m-player deterministic re-
cursive game has a stationary NE, even for m= 13.
3.4 ω-Regular Objectives and Mean-Payoff Games
Ummels and Wojtczak proved membership of PSPACE by giving reductions to ETR
for the problem of deciding existence of a stationary NE meeting given payoff con-
straints in several classes of games. For perfect information stochastic games where
all players have Streett or Rabin objectives (called Streett-Rabin games), or where all
players have Muller objectives a non-determistic polynomial time many-one reduc-
tion to ETR is constructed [32]. For perfect information mean-payoff games a (deter-
ministic) polynomial time many-one reduction to ETR is constructed [30]. Using the
characterization of ∃R in terms of nondeterministic Blum-Shub-Smale machines it is
straightforward that the many-one reductions may be combined with decision of ETR,
thereby proving ∃R-membership for the problems of deciding existence of NE meeting
given payoff constraints.
Street-Rabin games generalize reach-a-set games and stay-in-a-set games where
all objectives are terminal. One may prove ∃R-membership for general reach-a-set and
stay-in-a-set games in a similar way as Ummels and Wojtczak did.
Theorem 7. It is ∃R-complete to decide whether a given m-player perfect information
reach-a-set game has a stationary NE, even for m= 7.
Proof. Recursive games with non-negative rewards may, after normalizing rewards to
[0,1], be viewed as a special case of reach-a-set games. The result then follows from
Theorem 5.
Theorem 8. It is ∃R-complete to decide whether a given m-player perfect information
stay-in-a-set game has a stationary NE, even for m= 7.
Proof. Hansen and Raskin [22] constructed a 2-player perfect information stay-in-a-set
game without any stationary NE. We may use this game in place of GnoNE in the proof
of Theorem 5. Namely, consider transforming the game G∃NE(S ) by first dividing all
rewards by 2 and then subtracting 1 from all rewards. This does not alter the set of NE
of the game, but maps all rewards to the interval [−1,0], which may then be viewed as
a stay-in-a-set game with terminal safety objectives. We may then replace GnoNE by the
2-player stay-in-a-set game of Hansen and Raskin, where we let Player 4 and Player 5
take the role of the 2 players and all nodes of this game are excluded from the safe sets
of Player 1, 2, and 3.
Let us finally consider mean-payoff games. Ummels andWojtczak [30] note that in
mean-payoff games, non-negative fractional terminal rewards may be simulated with
a simple cycle where all rewards are chosen from the set {0,1}. From Theorem 2 and
the above ∃R-membership result we thus obtain the following.
Theorem 9. It is ∃R-complete to decide whether a given m-player deterministic perfect
information mean-payoff game where all rewards are 0 or 1 has a stationary NE that
satisfies a given payoff demand, even for m= 13.
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4 Equilibria in Tree Games
Littman et al. [24] proved it NP-hard to decide existence of a NE satisfying given payoff
demands for 2-player game trees. The proof applies both to positional and stationary
NE, as well as positional and stationary SPE. We describe a variation of their proof
below for completeness.
Recall that PARTITION is the NP-complete problem of deciding whether for given
a ∈ Zn+ there exist S ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} such that ∑i∈S ai = K/2, where K = ∑
n
i=1 ai. For a
rational valued vector a ∈ Qn+, which is possible in our constructions, the problem is
even strongly NP-complete [34]. We define GPARTITION(a) to be the game depicted in
Figure 9, where an initial chance node selects an item i uniformly at random, Player 1
can then choose to give the item to Player 2 (i.e. choose rewards (0,ai)), or pass the
turn to Player 2, who may either give the item to Player 1 (i.e. choose rewards (ai,0)
or discard it (i.e. choose rewards (0,0)). Consider the subgame at node ui, let pi be
→
u1
1
v1
2
(a1,0)
(0,0)
(0,a1)
un
1
vn
2
(an,0)
(0,0)
(0,an)
1
n
1
n
...
Figure 9: The partition game GPARTITION(a).
the probability that Player i gives the item to the other player, i = 1,2. In a NE we
have either (p1, p2) = (1,0) or p1 = 0 (and p2 arbitrary). Thus the only NE (which
are also positional and subgame perfect) where the total payoff of the players is ai are
(p1, p2) = (1,0) and (p1, p2) = (0,1). It follows that NE in the game GPARTITION(a)
in which both players receive payoff K/2 are positional and SPE and they correspond
exactly to equal partitions of the integers a1, . . . ,an. This gives a reduction showing NP-
hardness of deciding existence of a NE satisfying payoff demands, even for 2-player
games.
Theorem 10 (Littman et al. [24]). It is NP-hard to decide whether for a given 2-
player tree game there exist a NE satisfying given payoff demands. This hold for both
positional NE, stationary NE, positional SPE and stationary SPE.
It is not difficult to prove NP-membership, and with it strongly NP-completeness
due to [34], for existence of NE (SPE) for 2-player tree games or for existence of posi-
tional NE (SPE) for m-player tree games, that satisfies given payoff demands. Proving
NP-membership for existence of stationary NE (SPE) inm-player tree games satisfying
given payoff demands is to our best knowledge yet an open problem.
Using the chance node gadget of Ummels andWojtczak of Lemma 4 gives strongly
NP-hardness for deterministic tree games.
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Corollary 2. It is strongly NP-hard to decide whether for a given 5-player determinis-
tic tree game there exists a stationary NE satisfying given payoff demands. This holds
also for positional SPE.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have focused on the complexity of decision problems concerning sta-
tionary NE in perfect information stochastic games, and we have obtained the first
∃R-completeness result for such games, even for acyclic games. While existence of
NE with payoff constraints is undecidable for general games, as shown by Ummels
and Wojtczak [32], it is decidable for acyclic games. Indeed, for acyclic games, (gen-
eral) NE correspond to stationary NE in the unfolding of the game into a tree game.
We consider it an interesting problem to determine the precise complexity of existence
of (general) NE meeting given payoff demands for acyclic games.
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